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THE EU BUDGET:  








The legend of the Trojan Horse, told in Virgil's Aeneid, exemplifies a 
masterstroke of cunning. At the end of the 12th century BC, after ten years 
of war, the Greeks could not breach Troy’s walls. Yet, the Trojans could 
not drive the Greeks away. 
Then, the Greeks devised a plot. Pretending to admit defeat and to sail 
home, they left behind them a huge wooden horse as an offering to the 
goddess Athena. Thirty Greek warriors hid themselves inside the horse. In 
fact, the Greek fleet actually hid just nearby. 
Smelling a trap, the priest Laocoon wanted to burn the horse and 
warned the Trojans: 
 
“O wretched countrymen! What fury reigns? What more than madness has 
possess’d your brains? Think you the Grecians from your coasts are gone? 
(…) Somewhat is sure design’d, by fraud or force: Trust not their presents, 
nor admit the horse” (Vergilius). 
 
The Trojans ignored the warning and rolled the horse into the city as a 
reminder of their victory. During the night the Greek warriors came out of 
the horse and opened Troy’s gates to the other Greek warriors. There was a 
big battle and the Greeks won.  
The idea of a “Trojan Horse”, meant as a way to put in place the 
conditions for achieving specific objectives, is somewhat implicit in the 
EU’s actions, whose aim is to reach a better result than the member states 
                                                          
1 The opinions expressed by the author in this publication in no way commit the 
European Court of Auditors to which he belongs. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the insightful comments as well as the editorial assistance received. 
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could achieve by themselves. This aim is the basis of the EU added value 
concept. 
2. The EU fundamentals 
The European Union originates from the member states’ decision to 
pool selected aspects of their respective sovereign powers to attain 
objectives they have in common (Articles 1, 5(1)(2) of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU)). The Union’s competences, most of which are 
shared with the member states, are therefore based upon the achievement 
of these objectives.2 The Union’s competences imply the identification of 
“what” the EU should be doing and “how” it should be done. Here the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality come into play. Before 
launching an initiative, it is essential to systematically check (a) whether 
public action is really necessary, (b) whether action at the European level 
is the most appropriate, and (c) whether the measures chosen are 
proportionate to achieving those objectives (European Commission 
2001, 11). 
The subsidiarity principle, applicable in the areas of shared 
competence with the member states, requires one to demonstrate that the 
member states cannot sufficiently achieve the objectives of the proposed 
EU action, which can instead, by reason of its scale or effects, be better 
achieved by the Union (Art. 5(3) TEU). Subsidiarity implies weighing up 
all types of advantages and disadvantages and, finally, the exercise of 
political discretion. Subsidiarity is a dynamic concept that allows EU 
action to be expanded where the circumstances so require and, conversely, 
                                                          
2 Art. 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union establishes three 
categories of EU competences depending on the intervention field (exclusive, 
shared with the member states, and competence to carry out actions to support, 
coordinate or supplement the members states’ actions). The European Union has 
exclusive competence in few areas (see Art. 3 TFEU). It is worth mentioning that 
Art. 4(1) TEU (and Declaration No. 18 in relation to the delimitation of 
competences attached to the Treaty of Lisbon) underlines that “competences not 
conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States”. Protocol 
No. 25 on the exercise of shared competence clarifies that “when the Union has 
taken action in a certain area, the scope of this exercise of competence only covers 
those elements governed by the Union act in question and therefore does not cover 
the whole area”. An increase or a reduction of EU competences can be decided in 
accordance with the Treaty’s ordinary revision procedure provided for in Art. 48 
TEU. The procedure can be initiated by the member states, the European 
Parliament or the Commission. A Treaty revision would require ratification by the 
member states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
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to be restricted or discontinued where it is no longer justified. One of the 
characteristics of EU action is therefore to be “inevitable” in terms of 
reaching a better result and making a real difference.3 The underlying logic 
is that for every EU action, one should be able to convincingly answer the 
question: Why Europe? 
Moreover, the content and form of any Union action should be limited 
to “what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties” (principle 
of proportionality) (Art. 5(4) TEU). All EU measures should leave as 
much scope for national decision as possible. This concept explains, for 
example, why the Union has no administration at the individual country 
level so that it must rely on each member state to implement its decisions. 
The EU’s implementing power is consequently residual and not 
monopolistic. The EU administration is, in fact, a chain of national 
administrations (Sigma 1998, 13). 
EU actions are pursued above all through EU legislation. The latter is 
at the root of a significant (and growing) part of national legislation and is 
therefore instrumental in bringing different national laws in line with each 
other and effecting changes in the member countries’ basic economic, 
social and political structures. For governments, EU law might even 
represent a welcome externally imposed discipline for overcoming internal 
resistance to far-reaching domestic reforms (i.e., the “vincolo esterno” 
metaphor conceptualised by the Italians). 
3. The EU budget 
As observed by the President of the European Commission, the EU 
budget is one of the tools available to achieve the Union’s objectives and, 
in particular, to foster change (Barroso 2008). 
As a consequence of the European Union’s unique framework, the EU 
budget represents a type of “rare bird” in all aspects, from its approval and 
                                                          
3 For example, the European Parliament has underlined that the main purpose of 
EU budgetary spending is to create European added value (EAV) by pooling 
resources, acting as a catalyst and offering economies of scale, positive 
transboundary and spill-over effects thus contributing to the achievement of agreed 
common policy targets more effectively or faster and reducing national 
expenditure. EU spending must always aim at creating greater value than the 
aggregated individual spending of member states (see European Parliament 2011, 
para. 15). 
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financing, through the management of its revenue and expenditure, to 
holding to account for its implementation.4 
The EU budget does not, in general, finance goods and services aimed 
directly at EU citizens.5 A significant part of its expenditure 
(approximately one-third) is devoted to agricultural markets and direct 
payments to farmers. The rest is divided up into more than 70 spending 
programmes, covering a wide range of sectors and contributing to similar 
actions financed from national budgets (for example, providing funds for 
infrastructure and favouring productive investments, training, research and 
studies).6 In quantitative terms, the EU funds represent a relatively 
marginal financial contribution to the far higher-funded national 
programmes.7 In some cases (notably, Cohesion, Rural Development and 
Fisheries), the EU actions are co-financed by national budgets. As a result, 
the EU and the national budgets are closely interconnected. 
The EU budget has evolved over the years from a primarily political 
instrument of compensation to an instrument for economic development 
and pan-European objectives. Currently, the budget is a hybrid between a 
political and an economic instrument. One example is its pivotal role in 
the development of the internal market by making it acceptable for the 
member states (Núñez Ferrer 2012, 8). The cohesion policy is another 
example where the policy’s rationale goes well beyond its financial 
dimension because it focuses on a long term change in investment patterns 
and on overcoming structural barriers to development; in order words, a 
                                                          
4 For a complete review of the EU budget process, see European Commission 
(2008a). For a critical analysis, see the numerous contributions presented in the 
context of the EU budget review (European Commission 2008c). My own 
considerations are developed in Cipriani (2007). 
5 BusinessDictionary.com defines a public good as an “item whose consumption is 
not decided by the individual consumer but by the society as a whole, and which is 
financed by taxation. A public good (or service) may be consumed without 
reducing the amount available for others, and cannot be withheld from those who 
do not pay for it. Public goods (and services) include economic statistics and other 
information, law-and-order enforcement, national defence, national parks, etc. No 
market exists for such goods, and they must be provided to everyone by the 
government.” 
6 For an overview of the different programmes funded by the EU budget, see 
European Commission (2012c). 
7 For example, although taking approximately 1/3 of the EU budget resources, the 
cohesion policy is still a relatively small policy when compared to similar spending 
in member states. Another example is provided by the research domain, the bulk of 
whose public funding is provided by the national budgets (approximately 95%). 
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“Trojan Horse” to improve and modernise public administrations, to 
enhance transparency and to foster good governance (Hübner 2007, 3). 
The concept of EU added value mentioned earlier implies the ability to 
do things that nobody else can (or will) do, with better results. For the EU 
budget, this added value means that one euro spent at the EU level can 
offer more than one euro spent at the national level (European Commission 
2004, 5,8). The EU budget raison d’être is, therefore, to produce a better 
added value compared to national spending, not to replace it. 
Yet, what can the EU budget do that the member states cannot do for 
themselves? Does the European Union’s role in a given policy area 
necessarily require EU spending? Is an EU budget of over €130 billion 
needed? 
There is no straightforward answer to these questions because there are 
no “objective” criteria for deciding whether a policy fulfils the conditions 
for EU financing.8 For example, if funding for cohesion, agriculture and 
research can be traced back to the Treaty, the latter does not clarify what 
actions should be undertaken and how much money should be invested in 
those policies. This lack of clarity is why the European Court of Auditors 
has suggested that “[t]he concept of European added value should be 
articulated in a suitable political declaration or in EU legislation in order to 
provide guidance to the EU's political authorities to be used when 
choosing expenditure priorities” (European Court of Auditors 2010a, 
point 18). 
In fact, because of the integration between the European states, “nearly 
all policies have a European dimension and a national dimension” 
(European Commission 2002, 20).9 In practice, the decision to complement 
EU actions with spending measures is made on “political” grounds. In 
                                                          
8 It is worth mentioning that, already in 1978, the Commission had tried to define 
the intervention of the EU budget on the basis of criteria such as “economies of 
scale”, the “need for a global approach with the other policies funded” or the 
“reduction of the burden of national budgets” (see European Commission 1978, 6–
8). However, these criteria turned out to be too vague to be applied. With the 
Lisbon Treaty, it would still be possible for the EU budget to intervene in all 
sectors. Indeed, while the Treaty establishes three types of categories and areas of 
EU competence (see note (i)), it does not provide operational criteria to define the 
EU area of intervention. 
9 For example, immigration, justice, taxation, the labour market, energy and 
telecommunications are all sectors in which responsibilities are still largely 
national but which doubtlessly have effects across frontiers. 
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given situations, on the basis of different arguments, the member states can 
decide that the “European” level is preferable to the national level.10 
Without denying the difficulties and differences surrounding the 
concept of EU added value,11 it appears reasonable to identify three main 
characteristics for EU expenditure: catalytic (making something happen 
that otherwise would not happen or would happen more slowly); targeted 
(concentrated on the best added value and the most effective results on the 
basis of evaluation and impact assessment); and realistic (objectives 
should be achievable). 
The use of the EU budget to make something happen that otherwise 
would not happen is based on three elements.  
There is first “money”, earmarked for specific objectives and meant to 
increase the overall funds available nationally for a given policy. This can 
be relatively significant in some cases.12 
Second, these funds are made available for spending according to 
specified rules that are instrumental to achieving the EU added value 
through a number of specific requirements concerning for example public 
procurement, competition, environment, financial management, audit and 
control. More recent tendencies aim to introduce other forms of 
conditionality, such as funding disbursements that are linked to the 
                                                          
10 Gros (2008, 2) argues that the current composition of spending is the result of 
historical accidents and that the main legacy of the ‘founding’ compromises on 
Agriculture and Structural Funds is that the budget is basically seen as a vehicle for 
the redistribution of money between member states, rather than as a tool for 
fostering common goals. 
11 For example, Tarschys (2005) observes that the notion of European added value 
can often appear to be capable of justifying almost anything as a worthy target for 
European funding. To make the concept operational in policy-making practice, one 
should design procedures and methods for assessing how the specific programmes 
and projects rank. This assessment would speak in favour of a two-pronged 
strategy. First, there is a need to take a hard look at the economic elements 
involved. Returns could differ a great deal between various policy areas. The 
second part of the appraisal would aim at estimating the strength of the various 
proposals with regard to their contribution to European cohesion, in the widest 
sense of that word. As a result, the concept of European added value should be 
reserved for (i) investments where the limited scope of the member states and the 
existence of economic externalities reduce their propensity to take appropriate 
action and for (ii) programmes and projects likely to make substantial 
contributions to promoting the sense of community and effective interaction within 
the European Union. 
12 For example, for the 2007–13 period, some €348 billion are set aside for 
Cohesion (all Funds), €96 billion for Rural Development, and €50 billion for 
Research programmes. 
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achievement of results or the countries’ compliance with the Stability and 
Growth Pact (European Commission 2011b, articles 11 and 21). 
Third, the budget is implemented by the Commission on its own 
responsibility and with regard for the principles of sound financial 
management.13 However, to reflect the EU model of governance without 
government, the EU spending programmes can be implemented through 
several management modes, which are very different in nature and which 
imply a variable intensity for the EU intervention.14 This intensity concerns, 
in particular, the degree of decision by the Commission in granting the funds 
and its direct control at the level of the funds’ beneficiaries. 
For most of the expenditures (approximately 80%), there is “co-
administration” with the member states based on a partnership (or “shared 
management”). This partnership means that in reality the financial 
implementation (Commission) is dissociated from the main decision-taking 
aspect (member states). In particular, the member states must satisfy 
themselves that the actions financed from the EU budget are actually carried 
out and implemented correctly, while the Commission has a supervisory role 
and is not expected to micro-manage the implementation of the spending 
programmes. This segregation of functions shows that the EU might well 
have a “shared competence” in terms of policy, without necessarily having a 
corresponding full competence in terms of implementation. 
4. Beware of myths 
When discussing EU expenditure, very often three “myths” come to 
light. The first myth is that significant spending is essential to achieve 
some public objectives. The second is that spending is a sufficient 
                                                          
13 See Art. 17(1) TEU and 317 TFEU. In particular, Art. 17(1) TEU provides that 
the Commission shall execute the budget and “manage programmes”. This 
addition from the Lisbon Treaty appears to indicate an enhancement of the 
Commission’s role. One should also note that the “cooperation” with the member 
states in the budget implementation is related to specific tasks only and, therefore, 
it should not undermine the Commission’s full responsibility (Art. 317 TFEU). 
14 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the 
Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European 
Communities as amended last by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1525/2007 of 17 
December 2007 provides for four different management modes: centralised 
management by the Commission (used mainly for administrative expenditure and 
internal policies), shared management with member states (namely agriculture and 
rural development, cohesion), decentralised management (external actions/pre-
accession aid) with third countries and joint management (cooperation with 
international organisations). 
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condition for durable results. The third is that when EU payments are 
found to be irregular, recovery procedures can fully repair the damage to 
the EU budget. 
4.1 No spending, no results 
To what extent a given policy requires EU spending (or non-budgetary 
measures only) depends on an assessment of EU spending’s added value 
compared to national spending. As has been observed, the strongest 
generators of economic expansion are most likely found in the regulatory 
sphere. The important engines for this development are the internal 
market, the monetary union and the growing mobility of skills and 
knowledge. In stimulating lasting growth, the EU’s rules matter more than 
the EU’s expenditures (Núñez Ferrer 2012, 43). 
For example, crossing borders between some national rail systems 
remains complicated because many trans-European rail services are 
interrupted by required stops at border locations. Making progress on 
alleviating these constraints has the potential to facilitate improvements in 
trans-European transport that are of comparable scale to the performance 
gains that result from significant investments in infrastructure. As shown 
below, this progress would entail more co-operation between the member 





25 minutes saved and 25 minutes delay on Priority Project 1 
25 minutes 
The journey time saved by 
constructing a new high speed 
line between Nürnberg and 
Ingolstadt in Germany at an 
overall cost of 2,336 million 
euro (with EU co-financing of 
134 million euro from TEN-T). 
 
The additional time needed for a 
technical control for trains entering 
Italy at the Brennersee station at the 
Austrian-Italian border, because the 
Italian railway undertaking does not 
accept the technical control already 
carried out at the point of departure in 
München by its German counterpart. 
 
(European Court of Auditors 2010c) 
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4.2 Just a question of money 
The success of the EU budget cannot be measured by a high rate of 
expenditure implementation. This rate could represent a good indicator of 
“political efficiency” for the various levels of government concerned, 
showing how far their (often short-term) expectations have been fulfilled. 
However, a more adequate approach would require an examination of 
“policy efficiency” and, in particular, of the achievement of the declared 
objectives. 
Things do not happen automatically just because there are funds and 
processes in place. The European added value of a policy is not only 
dependent on its stated objectives but also on its management system, 
funding tools and implementation. Policies that, at face value, appear to 
have a high added value can fail to deliver it in practice (Núñez Ferrer 
2012, 10). Box 4-2 shows a key EU objective that might not be achieved 
due to an inadequate framework. 
 
 
4.3 Recovery procedures: a full damage waiver 
EU rules allow the Commission to apply financial corrections in the 
case of irregularities in EU spending. In the Commission’s view, these 
procedures permit the restoration of a situation where 100% of the EU 
expenditure complies with the applicable rules.15 Yet, the effectiveness of 
ex-post clearance in both “cleaning” national expenditure and in representing 
                                                          
15 Financial corrections are the main tool for the correction of errors and 
irregularities in the context of shared management. The final objective is to ensure 
that all expenditure declared by the member state (i.e., on the basis of which the 




Measures taken to date to reduce fishing overcapacity by adapting the 
fishing fleet to fishing resources have been unsuccessful. This is due in 
particular to important weaknesses in the framework, such as the existing 
definitions of fishing capacity did not adequately reflect the ability of 
vessels to catch fish; fleet capacity ceilings do not impose real restrictions 
on fishing fleet capacity; despite the key objective of aligning fishing 
capacity to fishing opportunities, fishing overcapacity has not been defined 
or quantified (European Court of Auditors 2011d).
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a deterrent against irregularities does not meet with unanimous agreement 
(Box 4-3).16 
Three main factors weaken the actual impact of the financial correction 
mechanisms. First, financial corrections do not constitute genuine financial 
sanctions. Corrections are limited to a recovery of EU irregular 
expenditure from member states and the final recipient may feel no effect 
whatsoever. The same expenditure can still continue to be financed 
through national budgets and represent, in the end, a further contribution 
by taxpayers. Additionally, the practical possibility of imposing financial 
corrections is very much dependent on the necessarily reduced number of 
the Commission’s controls. Second, as these corrections generally occur at 
the end of a programme, it is no longer possible to correct any 
fundamental system weaknesses and to re-direct the objectives to be 
achieved by the co-financed policies. Third, due to the “input” nature of 
EU expenditure, based on items of eligible spending, the extent to which 
the expected outputs, outcomes and impacts are achieved by the EU 
programmes is not the basis on which a financial correction is triggered. 
The regular (and increasing) occurrence of financial corrections has 
made them an inevitable routine procedure, thus demonstrating the limited 
deterrence of this instrument and its reduced ability to effect structural 
repairs. The corrections can counteract the financial consequences of an 
“error”, but not necessarily solve the problem at source.17 
 
                                                          
16 Parliament has recently confirmed serious doubts on the effectiveness of 
financial corrections mechanisms (see European Parliament resolution of 10 May 
2012 with observations forming an integral part of its Decisions on discharge in 
respect of the implementation of the European Union general budget for the 
financial year 2010, Section III – Commission and executive agencies, paras. 120–
122). 
17 This situation, for example, occurs in the case for the non respect of procurement 
procedures, a key precondition for the implementation of the internal market but 
also a major source of infringements in the cohesion area. If public administrations 
and beneficiaries in the member states are unable to improve the implementation of 
the procurement rules, the cohesion policy would continue to be systematically 
affected. 




Financial corrections are, above all, an indicator of whether a policy 
has been implemented according to the established rules. If EU money is 
invested to achieve some sensible results, it can then be said that the 
objectives have not been met. As a result, the higher the number of 
financial corrections, the higher the evidence of failure and missed 
opportunities. 
5. Light and shadow 
The EU budget’s reputation is sometimes tainted by cases of waste and 
fraud, which can represent a temptation to question the budget’s very 
Box 4-3 
 
The likelihood of recovery of an undue payment made under the 
Common Agricultural Policy is affected by delays in the member states 
initiation of recovery procedures, shortcomings in their recovery 
actions, and their limited enforcement possibilities. During the period 
2006–2008 around 90% of the amounts reported in the EU annual 
accounts as “recoveries of undue payments” were those made by the 
Commission through deductions from the member states and not actual 
recoveries of the unduly paid aid from beneficiaries. This undoubtedly 
protects the financial interests of the EU but without the full deterrent 
effect of a recovery made from an unduly paid beneficiary (European 
Court of Auditors 2011c). 
 
For the cohesion policy, although the financial correction process 
is lengthy (30 months on average), the Commission took the 
appropriate actions and measures were properly applied in about two-
thirds of the cases examined. However, there is a limited assurance that 
financial corrections mechanisms translate into lasting systems’ 
improvements as to avoid errors uncovered to occur again. Only in 
28% of the programmes the assurance was found to be high. This 
means that the Commission will have to take further corrective actions, 
entailing increasing resource and administrative costs. For half of the 
programmes examined member states were able to replace ineligible 
expenditure disallowed by new projects, thus off-setting the financial 
impact of the corrections. This is not without risks, since some of the 
deficiencies identified are systemic (e.g. incorrect application of 
procurement rules) and are therefore likely to apply also to new 
projects (European Court of Auditors 2012a).
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existence. Yet, there is no evidence that, overall, the EU budget is 
performing worse than national expenditures. Actually, for the policies 
where the actions are co-financed (for example, cohesion), if infringements 





As for the national budgets, the main issue is how to make the best use 
of the available funds. The following examples show that useful 
achievements are reached through EU spending, although this does not 
necessarily mean that these funds were used in the most effective way and 
that, compared to national spending, EU funding has resulted in a better 




The waste water and sewage sludge from urban agglomerations 
can affect the quality of Europe’s lakes, rivers, coastal waters, soils and 
ground waters. As a result the EU has adopted a series of directives and 
has also co-financed the building of urban waste water treatment plants 
through the Cohesion Fund and the ERDF. 
The EU funded infrastructures have contributed to a significant 
increase in the coverage rate of the urban population served. This is 
particularly marked in the four member states who received more than 
50% of EU expenditure for implementing urban waste water treatment 
for the 2000–06 programme period. Of the treatment plants visited, 18 
out of 26 were deemed to be operating satisfactorily with regard to 
capacity, having a utilization rate above 50%. In these cases, there was 
an adequate connection of households and industrial users to the 
treatment plant. A large majority of the treatment plants produced 
effluent meeting EU requirements. 
However, six of the seven cases of underutilization resulted from 
problems in completing the network, with many households and 
industrial users remaining unconnected to the treatment plants despite 
the plants being five years or more in operation. As a result, not all of 
the waste water produced in the area was treated. Where the quality of 
the effluent did not meet EU requirements (nine cases) one of the 
problems noted was that some treatment plants were being operated by 
local authorities lacking adequate resources and expertise and with no 
mechanisms in place to be informed of best practice (European Court 
of Auditors 2009b). 





The question is, therefore, how to make the EU budget more effective. 
In this respect, there are some lessons learned, pointing to three issues in 
particular. 
5.1 Institutional capacity 
As noted by the European Court of Auditors (2011a, para. 22), 
adequate institutional capacity is necessary to ensure that the EU funds are 
correctly spent to support durable economic development. The 
effectiveness of national management and control systems should 
therefore be ensured from the start. Regulation alone is, however, not 
enough. In this respect, the day-to-day actions of the managers in the 
member states are key because the assurance at the EU level heavily relies 
on their systems.18 Additionally, these bodies very often also manage 
                                                          
18 For example, the Commission’s analysis of errors in cohesion policy for the 
years 2006–09 points to weaknesses in the administrative capacity and the national 
management and control systems as the main factors explaining those errors (see 
European Commission, 2011c). 
Box 4-5 
 
Investments in water supply address different needs, such as: 
increasing availability of water in response to increased demand; 
expanding geographical coverage; improving the quality of the water 
distributed; improving the efficiency of water supply systems and the 
quality of the service.  
Structural measures spending has contributed to improving the 
supply of water for domestic use, either by increasing the available 
volume of water, extending the public network to areas which were 
previously not connected or improving water quality, network efficiency 
or service continuity.  
However, better results could have been achieved at a lower cost. In 
particular, the focus is on building infrastructures to exploit new water 
sources and attention is rarely paid to other solutions, such as reducing 
water losses and using other nearby resources. This could have made it 
possible to build smaller capacity infrastructure. Also, some projects 
were not operational because of missing complementary infrastructure. 
When measured by the two main efficiency parameters (capacity 
utilisation rate and non-invoiced water), several projects were found to 
operate with limited efficiency (European Court of Auditors 2010e).
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national funds. Here, the interest in getting things right is therefore 
common because there is a real win-win opportunity for both the EU and 
the member states and, ultimately, for the taxpayer. 
It is unrealistic to believe that in the current governance framework, 
the Commission can alone ensure an adequate budget implementation. As 
long as the member states do not put in place more effective management 
structures and increase the possibility that the Commission can rely upon 
these structures, it will not be possible to reduce the frequent checks, 
remedial action plans, and financial corrections, which will not 






Limited value was added by the Commission and the member 
states’ Managing Authorities’ appraisal (European Court of Auditors 
2010e). 
 
The Commission does not make full use of the instrument’s potential 
due to insufficient expertise in the priority areas related to the General 
Budget Support programmes’ objectives and weaknesses in its 
management of the dialogue process (European Court of Auditors 2010g). 
 
Education expertise is not optimally assigned and developed in 
Delegations. This deprives the Commission of a vital monitoring 
mechanism as well as of the best opportunities for effective influence 
on implementation (European Court of Auditors 2010h). 
 
The Commission assessments and decisions for Major Projects and 
Cohesion Fund projects did not lead to action to remedy project 
weaknesses observed during the audit. The results and impact of the 
projects were not monitored and empty ports and unused seaport 
infrastructures were found. Monitoring Committees and the Managing 
Authorities focused on the rate of spending. Some regions 
retrospectively financed replacement projects to absorb the available 
allocated resources. However, two of the three replacement projects 
included in the sample did not attain their objectives (European Court 
of Auditors 2012b). 
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The European Court of Auditors has, for example, observed that for a 
significant number of the transactions affected by error, sufficient 
information was available for the member state authorities to have 
detected and corrected at least some of the errors prior to certifying the 
expenditure to the Commission (European Court of Auditors 2009a, 
para. 4.23; 2010d, para. 4.25). This fact shows the difficulty of applying 
the principle of partnership and common interest that underlies the “shared 
management” arrangements. 
There is no “geography” of the good and bad administration; 
improvements are needed in all member states. Improvements are also 
needed within the Commission. As a consequence of the emphasis put on 
compliance and funds absorption, the institutional capacity has focused on 
processes rather than on the achievement of sensible objectives. The 
Commission should therefore improve its appraisal procedures, 
supervision, and the monitoring of achievements to make the best use of 
the funds. There is also a need to put the right skills in the right places. 
Some examples are provided below (Box 4-6). 
5.2 Needs and objectives 
The EU budget is not meant to replace the national budgets; it is meant 
to perform better than them. The “needs” are basically quantified by 1% of 
the member states’ GDP, which reflects what the member states’ 
governments consider to be an acceptable contribution, rather than the 
outcome of an EU added value driven analysis. Whether the 1% is too 
little or too much depends on what it is intended to achieve. 
As observed by the European Court of Auditors, the EU objectives are 
too wide-ranging, unclear or somewhat conflicting; policy instruments and 
resources are insufficient to meet the set objectives; causal links between 
the funded activities and the desired outcomes are unclear; and there are 
deficiencies in the monitoring and evaluation arrangements (European 
Court of Auditors 2010a, para. 14). Some examples are indicated below 
(Box 4-7). 
The EU’s expenditure is ‘input’ oriented, based on items of eligible 
spending, as opposed to disbursements based on a set of concrete 
objectives and linked to the achievement of results. Additionally, “fair 
return” considerations invite member states to seek “acceptable” net 
balances rather than specific policy objectives, leading to an inevitable 
trade-off between the desired outcomes and the spending levels. The 
absorption of funds potentially becomes an objective in itself, encouraging 
the dispersion of resources in a multitude of small initiatives whose main 
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characteristic is that they are easily implemented rather than that they have 
intrinsic added value. This situation introduces a tension with the aim of 
making efficient, effective and economic use of funding by pursuing 
specific policy objectives. In this way, the EU budget is adding 
“something” to a number of existing policies already financed by national 
budgets, with a result that the EU de facto makes no choices regarding 
purpose. Where “political efficiency” can be satisfied, “policy efficiency” 




In some cases, as shown below, the objectives of the programmes were 
eventually not achieved, also because they were found to be contradictory, 
such as in the sugar sector (Box 4-8). 
Box 4-7 
The usefulness of the programming work was reduced by 
insufficient clarity and prioritisation. Clarity was further reduced as the 
same priorities were reformulated and restructured from one document 
to the next. The lengthy programming and design process did not suit 
the fast changing and conflict-affected environment of the Southern 
Caucasus, endangering the relevance of the assistance. Programming 
and design of assistance were not sufficiently guided by a structured 
dialogue with the beneficiary countries (European Court of Auditors 
2010i). 
 
There was a lack of clarity as to what was to be achieved and how 
the success of the projects’ activities could be assessed. This had 
negative consequences for the implementation of projects (European 
Court of Auditors 2011b). 
 
Concerning the EU financial assistance for the decommissioning of 
eight non-upgradeable nuclear reactors, the Court found that 10 years 
after there is still no comprehensive needs-assessment, prioritization 
and setting of specific objectives (European Court of Auditors 2011e). 
 
None of the regions visited had a long term port development plan 
for seaports’ transport infrastructures. Needs assessments to support 
the selection of seaport infrastructure projects had not been carried out 
(European Court of Auditors 2012b). 





One of the consequences of the often grand EU objectives, with no 
clear or specific expected achievements, is that very little is known about 
the achievements, especially their outcomes and impacts (Box 4-9). This 
opacity makes it extremely difficult to identify (and report on) the added-
value that citizens get in return for their money. As the Court has observed, 
“[i]nsufficient information on results and outcomes also undermines 
accountability and transparency as well as decisions on the allocation of 
resources” (European Court of Auditors 2010a, para. 16). 
The lack of selective and focused objectives is directly reflected in the 
difficulty in setting measurable indicators for the policies financed. This 
difficulty, in turn, undermines the role of the ex-post evaluation and the 
Box 4-8 
 
There is no rationale in initially making available additional quotas 
and later striving to reduce them. Moreover, in the case of additional 
isoglucose quota, undertakings were paid even when they renounced 
quotas which had just been granted for free. The costs involved 
amounting to around 97 million euro cannot be justified. If additional 
costs are taken into account, the overall cost to the EU budget after the 
reform for the period 2007-2013 is likely to be 1.2 billion euro higher 
than before the reform. EU dependence on imports has been increased 
and the reduction of the prices of sugar is unlikely to benefit to final 
consumers (European Court of Auditors 2010b). 
 
Owing in particular to the low subsidy rate, the school milk 
scheme continues to be relatively unattractive and, as a result, 
generally has no more than a deadweight effect. In most cases, the 
products subsidised either would have been included in canteen meals 
anyway or would probably have been bought by the beneficiaries even 
without the subsidy. While the decision by certain member states to 
organise milk distribution free of charge has resulted in a more 
satisfactory impact, this form of distribution is at present covered by 
costly national schemes to which the Community budget makes only a 
marginal contribution. Both the School Milk and School Fruit Schemes 
allow only of a limited impact, especially as neither scheme has a 
mechanism for targeting priority needs (European Court of Auditors 
2010f). 
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potential ‘pedagogical’ effects for future policies. For example, the ex-post 
Evaluation of Cohesion Policy Programmes 2000-06 shows that, although 
quantitative targets were often set and an indicator system established, in 
many cases they were not linked in a meaningful way to any ultimate 
policy objectives and determined in relation to the funding made available 
and what it could plausibly achieve. Accordingly, targets were either 
attained far too easily or were unattainable given the funds deployed 




Due to the ‘input’ based design of the spending programmes, the focus 
of a significant number of the reporting documents provided by the 
national bodies and by the Commission rests on financial and physical 
implementation only. The Treaty of Lisbon has recently introduced an 
obligation for the Commission to establish “an evaluation report on the 
Union’s finances based on the results achieved”, in particular in relation to 
the indications given by the budgetary authorities (Art. 318 TFEU). The 
idea was that this evaluation would represent an assessment that goes 
further than the traditional record of budgetary implementation and rules 
compliance “so that the relation between the key performance indicators, 
their legal/political basis, the amount of expenditure and the results 
achieved is clear and transparent”.19 Yet, the first report falls short of this 
                                                          
19 See European Parliament resolution of 10 May 2011 with observations forming 
an integral part of the Decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of 
the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009, Section III, 
para. 200. 
Box 4-9 
The objectives of the programmes tend to be formulated in too general 
terms which hinders the design of the various components of the 
programmes and makes it more difficult to hold the Commission 
accountable for their effectiveness. The Commission should be able to 
demonstrate that the amount of funds allocated is appropriate in view of 
the objectives as well as the framework for dealing with risks and benefits. 
It is often difficult to assess whether conditions have been met or not, 
particularly due to a lack of clarity over what constitutes satisfactory 
progress as well as weaknesses in the statistical systems used for assessing 
results (European Court of Auditors 2010g). 
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expectation.20 This shortfall is primarily due to a lack of sufficient and 
reliable information on the results and impacts of the specific programmes 
(European Commission 2012). 
This means that if the EU rules oblige spending to comply with “sound 
financial management”,21 there is not yet a framework for ‘performance’ 
accountability. It is therefore not possible to provide a conclusive answer 
concerning the use of funds and their impact, thus making the 
Commission’s ultimate responsibility all the more fragile. 
6. If not now, when? 
The financial and economic crisis has put the spotlight on the member 
states’ severe public deficits, requiring the adoption of rigorous measures 
to significantly curb public spending. Tougher budgetary discipline and 
rigour will also be an issue for the next EU multi-annual financial 
framework, currently under discussion. In particular, future spending is 
bound to meet the expectations raised by the EU budget review for a more 
targeted and results-driven expenditure. Faced with these significant 
issues, the EU’s credibility in providing clear and visible benefits for the 
EU and its citizens that could not be achieved by spending only at the 
                                                          
20 For example, the European Parliament considered that the coverage and the 
content of this first report is not in line with the Treaty requirements (see resolution 
of 10 May 2012 with observations forming an integral part of its Decisions on 
discharge in respect of the implementation of the European Union general budget 
for the financial year 2010, para. 99). The European Court of Auditors observed 
that the report is vague, short on substance and, consequently, adds limited value. 
However, it presents the Parliament, the Council and Commission with an 
opportunity to discuss and agree how the evaluation report can be made useful to 
the discharge authority (see European Court of Auditors 2012c). 
21 See Articles 310 (5) and 317 TFEU. The concept of ‘sound financial 
management’ is built around three principles. The principle of “economy” requires 
that the resources used shall be made available in due time, in appropriate 
quantities, of appropriate quality and at the best price. “Efficiency” is 
characteristically a managerial value consisting, in essence, of maintaining a good 
ratio between the resources employed and the results attained. A related value is 
“effectiveness”, which basically consists of ensuring that the performance of public 
administration is successful in achieving the goals and solving the public problems 
set for it by law and government (see Sigma 1999, 13). These principles (known as 
the “three E’s”) are codified in the EU Financial Regulation under the concept of 
sound financial management (see Art. 27 of the Financial Regulation, Council 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 1605/2002, op. cit.). 
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national, regional or local level, is ultimately at stake.22 The current 
difficulties and the longstanding weaknesses require that a number of 
issues be addressed and that the necessary changes be put into place 
without delay. 
Indeed, identifying the areas where the EU dimension can offer more 
than national spending is not, in itself, sufficient. Spending on the right 
policies is only worthwhile if it secures the desired results (European 
Commission 2010d, 5–6). It is inevitable that hard choices are needed. A 
catalytical effect from EU expenditure would require a sufficient critical 
mass to produce visible results, which is also a factor in any potential 
increase of the EU citizens’ confidence. Given the present financial 
constraints and compared to the present framework, this requirement 
should mean more money for a “few” spending programmes, rather than 
less money for a plurality of programmes. Less funds from the EU budget 
does not necessarily mean less funds for a given policy, but rather the 
choice to have funding supplied by a different level of government.23 This 
concept would also mean fewer and more precise objectives than currently 
exist, to be put in relation to the available funding. The EU budget should 
provide the “cake” rather than the “icing”. 
Almost any expenditure creates somewhere some type of growth 
because it boosts consumption and therefore economic activity. It is, 
however, important to distinguish between short-term and lasting growth. 
                                                          
22 The conclusions of the Westendorp report are illuminating in this respect, stating 
already in 1995 that “the Union's principal internal challenge is to reconcile itself 
with its citizens. Therefore, enhancing its legitimacy in their eyes has to be the 
prime task of the coming reform. The achievement of this aim will depend on a 
clear definition of the Union's objectives, i.e., the joint goals sought, the credibility 
of common policies and the cooperation machinery designed to attain those 
objectives (or, to put it another way, the suitability of the instruments for the 
purpose of achieving the objectives set) and the preservation of the Union's 
internal cohesion” (Report by the Reflection Group: A Strategy for Europe, 
Brussels, 5 December 1995, part two, para. 10). The Reflection Group was 
established by the Corfu European Council of 24 and 25 June 1994 to examine the 
challenges to be addressed to bring the European Union up to date and to prepare it 
for the next enlargement. 
23 For example, as noted by Parliament, “a large proportion of the Union’s 
objectives have been taken into account by the Member States in their national 
budgets” (see European Parliament 2009, para 18). Parliament also noted that 
because the EU budget is very limited compared to the national budgets, there is a 
need to create synergies between the EU budget and the national budgets to 
implement common EU strategies. It stressed that coherence gives European 
policies greater impact, achieving true European added value while supporting 
long-term policy objectives (see European Parliament 2010, para. 15). 
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Consistent with the definition of EU added value and taking account of the 
limited resources available, one would expect EU expenditure to aim at 
long-term “sustainable” results. One should note in this respect that one of 
the three priorities of the Europe 2020 growth strategy is precisely to 
achieve sustainable growth (European Commission 2010a, 10; 14–17). 
However, the fact that less than half of the EU annual budget is currently 
directed at financing initiatives that support the Europe 2020 strategy 
shows the long road still ahead of us (European Commission 2011a, 10). 
The Commission’s claim of a results-driven EU expenditure (European 
Commission 2010c, point 4; 2011b, points 1 and 5.2.2.) should materialise 
with a shift from the ‘eligible’ inputs for spending towards outputs and 
outcomes. Yet, for example, for the future cohesion scheme, the Commission 
has essentially proposed retaining the old input-based framework, though 
with a few performance-based exceptions. The same applies to the future 
agricultural policy scheme, which remains fundamentally input-based and 
therefore oriented more towards compliance than performance. 
For EU expenditures to be measured in terms of real impact, rather 
than in terms of the inputs involved, there is a need to set meaningful 
indicators that are linked to realistic policy objectives and to evaluate at 
key intermediate points whether the defined objectives and intended 
impacts are likely to be achieved. 
Processes and rules are not enough to deliver the expected results. 
There is a need for adequate governance. Because it is about placing 
public resources in common to achieve EU objectives, it is legitimate to 
expect that the management of the EU funds takes place through an 
effective EU-driven process, resulting in a full accountability at the EU 
level. This management should be the role of the Commission that is 
charged by the Treaty to promote in various ways the general interest of 
the Union: giving policy direction and coherence, initiating proposals for 
EU law, and acting as the guarantor of EU law and of a level playing field 
in Europe (European Commission 2008b, 2).24 One of these roles is to 
“execute the budget and manage programmes” (Art. 17(1) TEU). As a 
result of an enhanced concept of EU added-value, the full responsibility 
for the Budget implementation should lay in the Commission’s hands. 
One precondition is the alignment of the Commission’s tasks, powers 
and responsibilities. There should no longer be a segregation of functions 
between the EU and the national level, but a true “sharing” of roles under 
one single responsibility: national bodies handling EU funds should act on 
                                                          
24 As pointed out by Ponzano (2009, 218), the general interest of the Union does 
not necessarily correspond to the addition of national interests, nor does it equate 
to the lowest common denominator of the different national stances. 
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behalf of the Commission. This responsibility would require some form of 
accreditation and “contract” based upon pre-specified output and 
performance targets and budgetary allocations consistent with the EU 
objectives selected.25 The Commission should be prepared to directly 
endorse that, what is intended to be achieved, responds to the criteria of 
EU added-value. It is only if there is “one” implementation line (and not as 
many as there are national bodies), that the Commission’s ultimate 
responsibility can be sustained. 
The administrative structures at the national level should be assessed 
(at an operational level) by the Commission as being adequate to deliver 
the expected outcomes. The aim is to ascertain the structures’ capacity to 
“absorb” funds effectively, by putting forward, managing and maintaining 
meaningful and sustainable projects consistent with the pre-agreed policy 
objectives. A “selective” process for the identification of national bodies 
for EU spending (a type of “Champions league”) would introduce an 
element of “reward” and sound external pressure, which in the end should 
also benefit public spending at the national level.26 
In a future perspective, where one might look more to results than to 
the inputs of spending, the Commission will have to demonstrate that it 
has done everything possible to achieve the intended results, ‘making the 
difference’ when compared to purely national actions and that it has 
learned from past experience what does and does not work. Indeed, the 
primary purpose of accountability is not to cast blame and to punish. 
Accountability should rather help to identify lessons for the future that 
make future approaches more relevant and effective. 
The demonstration and acknowledgment that the EU’s actions add 
value to national policies and address people’s concerns more effectively 
than the “national” or “local” levels, potentially provides the grounds for a 
positive “Trojan Horse” impact on public spending in general. This effect 
occurs through identifying and promoting best practices in planning and 
                                                          
25 In its conclusions on the EU budget review, the Commission proposes the idea 
of a ‘Development and Investment Partnership Contract’ between the Commission 
and the member states, setting out the objectives to be achieved, how the progress 
towards the achievement of these objectives will be quantified and measured and 
the allocation of national and EU resources among the priority areas and 
programmes. Also, the Commission identifies the institutional capacity at a 
national, regional and local level as the key for successful development, 
implementation and monitoring of the policies. The allocation of EU financial 
resources should therefore take account of the capacity to effectively utilise these 
resources (see European Commission 2010d, p. 14). 
26 This process should be effective, in particular, because of the national co-
financing and/or because these bodies often manage other national funds. 
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managing by objectives, with managers held to account for the agreed 
expectations and the means used. 
7. Conclusions 
EU’s actions represent a kind of ‘Trojan Horse’ to achieve specific 
objectives with better results than the member states could do by 
themselves. This is the basis of the EU added value concept which can be 
articulated around three main characteristics: catalytic (making something 
happen that would otherwise not happen or would happen more slowly); 
targeted (concentrating on the best added-value and the most effective 
results on the basis of evaluation and impact assessment); and realistic 
(objectives should be achievable). 
To achieve EU objectives, EU spending is not necessarily required. For 
example, the strongest generators of economic expansion are most likely 
found in the regulatory sphere. In addition, spending is not by itself a 
sufficient condition for durable results. Finally, ineffective spending 
constitutes a missed opportunity that cannot be repaired ex-post. 
Making the best use of the available funds requires paying due 
attention to three issues in particular: adequate institutional capacity to 
realise sensible projects, the identification of the needs and the 
establishment of realistic objectives consistent with the available funds, 
and the demonstration of the results achieved through meaningful 
indicators. This is equally important for both the EU and the national 
budgets also because very often the same bodies manage funds from both 
sources. 
Consistent with the Europe 2020 growth strategy, the aim of EU 
spending should be to achieve sustainable growth. A distinction must be 
made between short-term and lasting growth. The requirement for a 
catalytic effect for EU expenditure would need to secure a sufficient 
critical mass to produce visible results. This concept should mean more 
money for a “few” spending programmes rather than less money for the 
approximately 70 current spending programmes. The EU budget should 
provide the “cake” rather than the “icing”. 
The natural outcome of a virtuous process where objectives are clear, 
agreed and realistic is an unequivocal ownership as a precondition for both 
achieving policy objectives and ensuring ‘value for money’. Because the 
EU budget is about placing public resources in common to achieve 
common EU objectives, it is legitimate to expect the Commission, as the 
promoter of the general interest of the Union, to be fully accountable for 
the money spent. For this to happen, a precondition is the alignment of the 
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Commission’s tasks, powers and responsibilities. An adequate accountability 
process for EU funds is not only instrumental in good management; it is 
also a critical condition of legitimacy for public authorities and therefore a 
factor in the potential increase of the EU citizens’ confidence. 
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